It can be shown that the problem of reliable transmission of data over an unreliable communication channel can be restated as a decentralized control problem of discrete-event systems. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to such decentralized supervisory control problems have been found. These conditions are used t o verify the correctness of a protocol for the data transmission problem. In particular, it is demonstrated that our method provides a systematic check on whether the protocol satisfies the required safety property, as opposed to relying on finding, ad hoc, circumstances under which the protocol fails.
Introduction
Supervisory control theory is a formalism for modeling discrete-event processes and applying control theoret,ic techniques to solve problems involving such processes. As in classical control theory, the power of the approach lies in first identifying the fixed part of the syst,em, i.e., the process to be controlled, which is called a plant, then applying control through the use of controllers. A control problem is one where at the outset the plant is not behaving as we wish it would and therefore we must find controllers that inhibit the plant's behaviour such that the plant exhibits some given desired behaviour. Typically, control theoretic work provides automatic procedures for deriving suitable controllers that solve a class of problems.
In [13] we introduced a problem formulation that captures those discrete-event systems whose problem description is given as global specifications but whose solution requires decentralized control. We also demonstrated that our formulation can be used to model the data transmission problem associated wit,h the Alternating Bit Protocol. Here we demonstrate that using these conditions, we can test whether a candidate protocol for the above data transmission problem is correct. Much work has already been done on protocol verification but the bulk of it focuses on what West calls "validation" [16] . Validation is distinguished from verification as follows. Validation is used to determine if a protocol satisfies certain correctness properties (sometimes referred to as syntactic properties) such as freedom from deadlock, unspecified receptions, and nonexecutable interactions' (sometimes referred to as logical errors). Verification is used to see whether a protocol achieves a desired functionality (sometimes referred to as semantic properties, as in [4] ). In other words, syntactic properties are those common to all protocols, whereas semantic properties are specific to some given protocol.
For protocols that can .be represented by communicating finite-state machines (such as the example in Section 3), the most widely used technique for protocol validation (of syntactic properties) is reachability analysis, an exhaustive search through the statespace of the overall system [l], [18] . For protocols that can be represented using a programming language model, a modal logic or some other formalism that admits predicates to describe system properties can be used for validation.
In this paper, we are interested in verification of the semantic properties of a protocol. In [2], Bochmann and Gecsei propose a method for such verification. A dra.wback to their technique is that it uses predicates over Petri nets and the verification procedure relies on producing a desired assertion but the paper does not provide a method for finding the appropriate assertion. On the other hand, their method handles both safety and liveness properties while ours can verify only safety properties. Hailpern code) and their assertions are temporal logic predicates. The work described in [7] , in particular that of Milner [9] , also addresses verification of semantic properties. Informally, they model protocols as processes in some process algebra and then show that the protocol is "equivalent" to some behavioural descrip tion of the problem specification. However, showing such an equivalence requires finding a relation over the process space and showing that this relation is what is called a bisimulation.
We show that describing communication problems as instances of control problems leads to an alternative, simple method for the verification of semantic properties of a protocol.
Background
The material in this paper is set in the supervisory control framework for discrete-event systems initiated [17] . Supervisory control theory draws from automata theory and the theory of formal languages; except where otherwise stated, the concepts in this section are taken either from the fundamentals of formal language and automata theory or from the above references.
We assume that the process to be controlled can be modeled by a five-tuple deterministic automaton G = (E, Q, 6, qo, Qm) where C is an alphabet of event labels, Q is a set of states, qo E Q is the initial state, Qm E Q is the set of terminal or marked states and 6 : C x Q -, Q, the transition function, is a partial function defined at each state in Q for a subset of C.
For the case where Q is finite, G can be represented by a finite state machine whose nodes are states and whose edges are transitions defined by 6. On such a transition diagram, the initial state is identified by an arrow entering it and marked states by circles around the nodes. The set C is the set of all edge labels 011 the diagram.
A string over a given alphabet is a sequence of labels from that alphabet. In our case, strings represent sequences of events. As is usual in formal language theory, C' denotes the set of all finite strings over C including the null string E . Then 6 can be extended to C' by defining 6 ( E , q ) := q and ( V a E C, s E E') 6 ( s a , q ) : = 6(u, b(s, q) ). Then G is characterized by two subsets of C* called the closed behaviour of To impose supervision on the plant, we identify some of its events as controllable and the rest as uncontrollable, thereby partitioning C into the disjoint sets C,, the set of controllable events, and E,,, the set of uncontrollable events. Controllable events are those which an external agent may enable or disable while uncontrollable events are those which cannot be prevented from occurring and are therefore considered to be permanently enabled. The event set C is also partitioned into disjoint sets CO and E,, of observable and unobservable events, respectively. Observable events are those which an external agent may observe during the course of tracking the plant. A supervisor is then an agent which observes subsequences of the sequences of events generated by G and enables or disables controllable events at any point in time throughout its observation. By performing such a manipulation of controllable events, the supervisor ensures that only a subset of L(G) is permitted to occur.
Formally, a supervisor S is a pair (S, $) where S is an automaton which recognizes a language over the observable event set of the plant G and $J, called a feedback map, is a map from the observable event set and states of S to the set {enable,disable} with the requirement that $J enable all uncontrollable events at every state of S. The automaton S tracks and controls the behaviour of G. It changes state according to its view of the events generated by G and, in turn, a t each state z of S the control rule $(a, z) dictat.es whether a is to be enabled or disabled at the corresponding state of G.
The behaviour of the closed-loop system, i.e., the sequences of events generated while the plant is under the control of S = (S, $), is captured by an automaton S / G whose closed behaviour, denoted by L(S/G), permits a string to occur if the string is in both G and S and each event in the string is enabled by $. The closed-loop system's marked behaviour is denoted by
L,(S/G) and consists of those strings in L ( S / G ) that are marked by both G and S.
Given any event set C, we may associate with it a mapping, called the canonical projection, which we interpret as a supervisor's view of the strings in E'.
The projection P : C' -C: is defined according to:
i.e., P erases all unobservable events. We consider the problem from [13] and [14] , formulated as follows: The language E embodies the system designer's notion of legal or desirable behaviour while A specifies the behaviour common to any accept,a.ble solution, i.e., the minimally adequate behaviour. That is, any solution must exhibit at least the behaviour described by A and no more than that, described by E.
The above problem can be solved by first considering the special case where the range of desirable behaviour is narrowed t o a single language, i.e., where A = E. This case was first solved in [5] , provided A and E are prefix-closed. The solution is conveniently described using the notions of controllability and coobservability defined in [ll] and [14] 
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Intuitively, a supervisor knows what action to take if it knows what sequence of events actually occurred. However, a string which, for each supervisor, looks like (i.e., has the same projection as) another string may be potentially ambiguous in determining control action. On this basis, if we assume that some external agent, such as a supervisor, determines which strings are allowed to be in and which in Ii, an informal description of co-observability is as follows. A language Ii' is co-observable if (1) after the occurrence of an ambiguous string, s, in R, the decision to enable or disable a controllable event U is forced by the action that a supervisor which can control U would take on other strings which look like s (encompassed by conjuncts (1)-(3) in the definition of co-observability), and (2) the decision to mark or not mark a potentially confusing string is determined by at least one of the supervisors (covered by conjunct (4)). The reader is referred to [14] for more details on co-observability.
The solution to our decentralized control problem for the special case where A = E is as fol- The procedure we use relies on the following results, taken from [14] . Consider the class of languages CCCo(M) := {Ii' I Ii' 2 M , A ' is prefix-closed, controllable, and co-observable}.
It can be shown that this class is nonempty and closed under intersection. Consequently, it contains an infimal element, which we denote by infCCCo(M).
When the plant G is finite-state and the legal language E is regular, we have a formula for computing inf CCCo(E). Moreover, by definition of inf CCCo(E), if E is prefix-closed, then E is controllable and co-observable if and only if inf CCCo(E) = E . So, to test if the decentralized control problem is solvable it suffices to compute inf CCCo(E) and see if it equals E itself.
An Example of Protocol Verification
We consider the problem of reliably transmitting frames of data over an unreliable channel in the data link layer of the International Standards Organization OS1 7-layer reference model'. The goal of a protocol for the problem is to ensure that a sender gets da.ta from a host3 computer, passes that data over a communication channel to a receiver, which must, then pass the data to another host in the same order and without duplicates as the data sequence received by the sender from the originating host. It is assumed that frames may be either lost or damaged by the communication channel. It is further assumed that the receiver has routines associated with it that enable it to detect damaged frames.
We informally describe some of the requirements of a protocol solution. Since the channel can lose frames, there must be some mechanism for retransmission. So that retransmissions will he prompted by channel losses, the sender has a timer that it sets after it has transmitted a frame. If the timer times out, the sender sends the frame again. Moreover, to avoid duplicates and to maintain the correct order, the receiver must be able to distinguish a frame it is seeing for the first time from a retransmission. Consequently, the sender is permitted to attach a sequence number to each frame that it sends. If we limit ourselves to stop-and-wait protocols4, the sender must, receive some acknowledgement from the receiver before it sends the next message. Consequently, the 2The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model is a proposed standard for network architecture which is organized as a series of layers. Each layer offers services to higher layers and machines in the same layer communicate via protocols for that layer. The data link layer is the layer above the physical medium; it breaks data into groups called "frames" and is responsible for ensuring that frames are t,ransmitted across the network without errors-even though errors may occur in the physical medium. See [15] for more details.
A h o d is a machine that runs user programs. 'Stop-and-Wait protocols, as defined in [IS]
, are those protocols in which, after having sent a frame, a sender wait.s for an acknowledgement before proceeding to its next step.
only ambiguity for a receiver is between a frame and its immediate predecessor or successor. It can, therefore, be shown that a 1-bit sequence number (0 or 1) is sufficient.
A protocol that appears to solve the problem is given in [15] , p. 147. The protocol works as follows. The sender starts by sending the first frame with sequence number 0; upon receiving an acknowledgement from the receiver, the sender sends the second frame with sequence number 1. The sender continues to alternate sequence numbers between 0 and 1 in this way. The receiver starts by expecting a frame with sequence number 0; when it receives such a frame it knows that it is the first frame and passes the frame to the target host. The receiver then expects a frame with sequence number 1. If it receives any frames with sequence number 0, it knows they are retransmissions of the first frame and discards them. As with the sender, the receiver alternates between 0 and 1 in the sequence number it expects from a new frame.
In Figure 1 we present finite-state machine transla- where get f rame means the sender gets a new frame from the source host; sendo (resp. sendl) means the sender sends the most recent frame it got to the receiver with a sequence number of 0 (resp. 1); rcvo (resp. rcv1) means the receiver receives a frame whose sequence number is 0 (resp. 1); sendack means the receiver sends an acknowledgement to the sender; rcvack means the sender receives an acknowledgement from the receiver; passtohost means the receiver passes the frame it just received to the target host; timer means the sender starts the timer; timeout means the timer times out; cksumerr means that a frame has arrived damaged; cksunzerrack means that an acknowledgement has arrived damaged; and lose means the channel loses the message in it. When the channel capacity, b, is greater than 1 the channel losses must be indexed to indicate which message in the channel has just been lost. chronous product as defined by the concurrent operation in [8] and as used in [5] .
If we assume that each agent observes those events that occur at its physical location and that message receptions, channel losses, and timeouts are uncontrollable, then the partitions of event sets are as follows. The observable and controllable sets of events of the sender are As pointed out by Tanenbaum [15] , if the sender times out even though the channel has neither lost nor damaged a frame (rather, the acknowledgementunbeknownst to the sender-is on its way but is going t o take longer than expected to arrive), then the protocol given above does not solve the original problem. The offending scenario is as follows. The sender sends a frame but times out while the acknowledgement is still in the communication channel; therefore, the sender sends a duplicate. When the previous acknowledgement finally arrives, the sender may think that the duplicate frame is the one being acknowledged. If the next new frame sent is lost but the acknowledgement of the duplicate reaches the sender, the sender will not retransmit the lost frame as it will mistakenly assume that the acknowledgement just received is for the new frame.
A successful protocol for the transmission problem must possess two properties: (1) at any point in time, the sequence of data passed by the receiver to the target host must be a prefix of the sequence gotten by the sender from the source host and (2) every element in the sequence of data gotten by the sender from the source host must eventually be passed on by the receiver to the target host. The first property is a safety property since it does not require that any action take place but merely that if an action does occur, then it is not "bad". When this requirement is met the protocol is said to satisfy partial correctness [3] . The second property is a liveness property since it does require that some action take place. Since our model does not use infinite-string semantics, we cannot verify the liveness property. However, we will show that using our decentralized control formulation, the safety property can be checked.
To describe the safety property as a legality specificdon in supervisory control theory, we define the language E = L ( G ) n LEGAL where LEGAL is generated by the finite-state machine in Figure 3 . Since all states in LEGAL are marked, E is prefix-closed and hence F = E . According to the plant description, any new frame gotten by the sender from the source host is transmitted to the receiver at least once and the receiver only passes on to the target host frames it receives. Thus, the requirement in LEGAL that get f r a m e and passtohost strictly alternate ensures that if new data is passed to the target host, it is passed in the correct order and without duplicates. That is, sequences of events that are contained in the language LEGAL satisfy the safety property.
In terms of event, occurrences, the problematic sequence of events is given by the string t below: t = get f r a m e sendo timer rcvo passfoh.ost sendack timeout sendo timer rcvack rcvo sendack getframe sendl timer lose rcvack, where here the event lose refers to t,he loss of the frame with sequence number 1. This string t leads t o illegality because upon assuming that the last frame it sent has been correctly received, the sender will a.ttempt to get a new frame to pass to the receiver. This sequence of events is given by where U = getframe. Observe that tu # E , t u E L(G), 1 E E and a E Recall that, the premat,ure timeout. leads t,o 1 protocol failure because the lost frame is assumed to be received due to an earlier acknowledgement delayed in the communication pipe. If t,hat frame were not, in fact, lost the protocol would not fail a t that point. In other words, consider the sequence t' given as follows:
1' = getframe sendo timer rcvo passlohost sendack timeout sendo timer rcvack rcvo sendack get f rame sendl timer rcv1 passt oh ost rcvack.
Then t'a E E. However, the sender cannot, distinguish between the sequences t and t', i.e.,
P l ( t ) = Pl(t').
Therefore, E is not CO-observable w.r.t. the given pla.nt G (by conjunct (2) of co-observability).
Let us interpret the above plant as defining all p o s sible executions of a protocol and the legal language as only those executions where data is passed to the target host in the correct order and without duplicates. Then, the question "Is this protocol correct?" can be translated into "Can we ensure (via control) that only correct executions of the protocol are allowed to occur?". We know already that the protocol as given does not contain only correct executions (since l a # E ) but the more interesting question is "Why not?' or "What can be done about it?'.
Instead of searching ad hoc for a scenario where a given protocol fails, our results permit automatic a priori checking. That is, an application of Corollary 4.1 in [14] would indicatle immediately that the protocol given a.bove is not suitable since E is not co-observable w.r.t. G. In particular, as stated in Section 2 we could compute infCCCo(E) and would see that inf CCCo(E) # E. Since inf CCCo(E) # E but infCCCo(E) 2 E (by definition), it must be the case that infCCCo(E) 2 E which, in turn, implies that inf CCCo(E) -E # 0. Moreover, all the strings in infCCCo(E) -E are sequences of events in which the protocol fails but which resemble successful runs of the protocol. Consider the strings t , t' and the event a above; it can be shown that t u E inf CCCo(E) as follows. (First note that by definition inf CCCo(E) is prefix-closed so we write inf CCCo(E) for inf CCCo(E).) Since t , t'u E E , we have that t , t'u E inf CCCo( E ) (since E E infCCCo(E), by definition), and as stated above, t u E L(G); then, since infCCCo(E) is coobservable (by definition) and P l ( t ) = Pl(t'), we have that t u E inf CCCo(E). Moreover, as stated above, t u # E , so t u E infCCCo(E) -E.
Suppose that, in addition, t o finding out that the sequence of events tu would cause a protocol failure, we would like to determine why, then we can proceed as follows. Since U E \ C Z ,~, we know that conjunct (2) of co-observability must fail and hence we know that there exists at least one string t' such that P l ( t ) = Pl(t') and t'u E E. We can generate all such strings by computing the language P c ' ( P~( t u ) ) n E.
These strings are the successful runs of the protocol that resemble the "bad" run tu.
The protocol designer can use the test for controllability and co-observability not only to test whether the candidate protocol is correct but also to find out which sequences of events are problematic. That is, sequences of events that are not legal (i.e., are not in the given language E) but are nevertheless possible runs of the protocol (i.e., are generated by the given plant G), are problematic if they look like other successful runs of the protocol (i.e., their projections are the same) and cannot be disambiguated by one of the agents (i.e., one of the conjuncts of co-observability does not obtain). The designer can then compute the language inf CCCo( E) -E to determine scenarios that would cause the protocol to fail.
Conclusions
We have shown that for communication problems that can be formulated as cases of our decentralized supervisory control problem, our control-theoretic results can be used to verify if a given protocol for the communication problem is partially correct. Our procedure is automated and allows a protocol designer to systematically verify if a protocol satisfies the intended safety requirements. In addition, if our check indicates that a protocol would fail, then the designer may get additional insight into the problem by generating all sequences of events that would lead to failures. However, we do not as yet have any mechanism for error recovery. Moreover, our formalism does not, at present, permit liveness properties to be verified. To address the issue of liveness, we would need to extend our model to include infinite-string semantics.
